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LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DATA RETENTION IN 
THE LIGHT OF AN ANONYMISATION SERVICES
by
STEFAN KÖPSELL* & PETR ŠVENDA**
The recently introduced legislation on data retention to aid prosecuting cyber-re-
lated crime in Europe also affects the achievable security of systems for anonymous  
communication on the Internet. We have analysed the newly arising risks associ-
ated with the process of accessing and storage of the retained data and propose a se -
cure logging system, which utilizes cryptographic smart cards, trusted timestamp-
ing servers and distributed storage.  A practical  implementation of  the  proposed  
scheme was performed for the AN.ON anonymity service, but the scheme can be  
used for other services affected by data retention legislation. We also discuss the  
practical experience from process of response to legal authorities’ requests both be-
fore and after the data retention directive was implemented. Moreover we give a  
general description of the legal obligations and the information about usefulness of  
the retained data is also provided. Derived from these obligations we give argu-
ments reflecting challenges and obstacles for a secure and privacy respecting imple-
mentation of data retention.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The legislation on data retention affects—at least in some countries  (e.g., 
Germany) — systems for anonymous communication on the Internet such 
as AN.ON [BeFK00] or TOR [DiMS04]. As a provider of one such anomity 
service,  we like to report on the impact of this legislation on the system, 
newly arisen risks associated with the legal compliance and our experience 
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with answering law enforcement requests for (possibly) retained informa-
tion. Additionally, we will  briefly present technical means how to legally 
comply, minimize these risks at the same time and discuss usability of the 
retained data for criminal prosecution.
The directive 2006/24/EC (data retention directive) “on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available  electronic  communication  services  or  of  public  communication 
networks”, passed by the European parliament on March 15th, 2006, sets 
the  legal  framework  of  data  retention  for  the  European  Union  member 
states.  According to the directive,  the member states have to “bring into 
force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to com-
ply with this directive by no later than 15 September 2007”. The goal of the 
directive is to strengthen the success of law enforcement in the area of Inter-
net-related crime and, more general, whenever electronic communication is 
involved. The motivation for the directive was that the data about past com-
munication relations is  already unavailable when it  comes to a trial after 
weeks  or  months,  in  which  evidence  from  the  communication  relations 
could be helpful. Data on communication relations can provide information 
about the person who accessed a specific website or who called a specific 
telephone, for instance. Germany has reacted to the data retention directive 
and adapted several laws [TKG07]. With respect to anonymity services on 
the Internet, the changes of the Telecommunications Act are most signific-
ant [TKG04]. This act defines in detail what kind of data had to be stored for 
various types of communications providers, including telecommunications 
companies like fixed-line or mobile phone providers and Internet service 
providers (ISPs). The act defined a retention period of six months. It anticip-
ated services like anonymity services, which are in the first place contradict-
ory to the law enforcement goals. In order to prevent any information gap, 
the Telecommunications Act declared in §113a ‘Retention of Data’:
‘(6) Those, who provide telecommunication services and thereby alter data  
which have to be stored according to this law, have to store the original data  
and the new data as well as the time of the alteration.’1
1 Note that the quotations of the Telecommunications Act is an unofficial translation of the 
official law text in German. The authors are not aware of any official translation of the 
current version of the Telecommunications Act. The former version (of 22 June 2004) is 
available in English at: 
<http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Gesetz/telekommunkationsgesetz-en>.
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Note that the commentary to this section issued by the legislator con-
firmed that this section was especially introduced because of anonymisation 
services. We want to emphasize that to the best of our knowledge this is a 
speciality of the German data retention law which we could not find in any 
other European data retention law.
After these new laws came into force 1st of January 2008 several com-
plains against these new regulations were presented to the German consti-
tutional court. On 11th of March 2008 a first  preliminary decision2 of the 
German constitutional  court sets restrictions with respect to the access of 
law enforcement agencies to the retained data. In order to get access to re-
tained data, the court demands the investigated crime has to be a “serious 
crime” listened within a catalogue of crimes3. But the court did  not forbid 
the data retention in general and required the data to be retained at least 
until the final decision of the court. The preliminary decision was prolonged 
(and slightly extended) three times: on 1st of September 20084, 28th of Octo-
ber 20085 and 15th of October 20096. The final decision of the court was an-
nounced on the 2nd of March 20107. At first, the court declared the imple-
mentation of data retention to be unconstitutional. Data retention had to be 
stopped  immediately  and  all  retained  data  so  far  had  to  be  deleted. 
Secondly, the court decided that data retention is  not unconstitutional  in 
principle. The court further explained that a new law has to be very specific 
about  the  necessary  conditions  under  which  law  enforcement  agencies 
could get access to the retained data. Moreover the court demands concrete 
procedures which ensure a secure storage of and access to the retained data.
To summaries, there is currently no data retention in place in Germany. 
But on the other hand the pressure from all sides to the minister of justice to 
issue new data retention laws is very high. This is especially true at the very 
moment  due  to  the  ongoing  terror  alarm in  Germany (December  2010). 
2 1 BvR 256/08, 11. March 2008, <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20080311_1b-
vr025608.html>; German Federal Law Gazette 2008, Part I, Nr. 13, Bonn, 10. April 2008, page 
659.
3 This catalogue is given in §100a(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure.
4 German Federal Law Gazette 2008, Part I, Nr. 41, Bonn, 23. September 2008, page 1850.
5 German Federal Law Gazette 2008, Part I, Nr. 53, Bonn, 27. November 2008, pages 2239–
2240.
6 1 BvR 256/08, 15. October 2009, <http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/vb_bver-
fg_beschluss_2009-10-15_1-bvr-256-08.pdf>; German Federal Law Gazette 2009, Part I, Nr. 
73, Bonn, 11. November 2009, page 3704.
7 1 BvR 256/08, 2. March 2010, <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100302_1b-
vr025608.html>; German Federal Law Gazette 2010, Part I, Nr. 11, Bonn, 17. March 2010, 
page 272.
308 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 5:2
Therefore we expect new data retention laws coming into the force within 
the next few months.
1.1. LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ON 
LOGGING OF RETAINED DATA
In this section, we summarize the requirements for the retained data and 
the logging procedures. These are general requirements applicable to any 
service which needs to be compliant with the EC data retention directive.  
They  can  be  divided  into  legal  obligations  (R1–R4)  and  the  operational 
needs (R5). Moreover, they can be classified as functional requirements (R1; 
what the system should do) and non-functional requirements (R2–R5; how 
the system should be).
R1: Logged data has to include all statutory categories of data. Article 5 
of the data retention directive describes what types of services have to re-
tain which data categories. National implementations of the directive could 
extend this. This functional requirement basically states that some meaning-
ful data has to be logged and that logging of (e.g.) random data would not 
be sufficient.
R2: Logged data have to be deleted after a specific period of time. This 
means that logged records cannot be accessed outside a given data retention 
period. In the following text we use the term “outdated” to describe a prop-
erty of a given item (cryptographic key, log entry etc.) to which the access  
should be prevented because the related retention period already expired. 
R3: Logged data need to be accessible, so that requests from law en-
forcement agencies can be answered without undue delay.
R4: Logged data have to be secure, so that no access to the logged data 
by unauthorised person is possible. This requirement covers confidentiality 
as well as integrity of the logged records. Note that in our case the integrity 
means that the operator can detect if the logged data have been altered—it 
is not necessary that the operator proves something to the third party.
R5: The cost of logging has to be reasonable. It includes the monetary 
costs (e.g. initial necessary investments, operational costs) but also the de-
gradation of the overall performance of the system as well as the organisa-
tional overhead.
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1.2. INTRODUCTION TO THE AN.ON SYSTEM
We are operating an anonymity service called AN.ON, which is based on 
Mixes. A Mix [Chau81] is a server which forwards messages thereby ensur-
ing that an outsider (e.g. an eavesdropper) cannot link incoming and outgo-
ing messages.  This  is  accomplished by a combination of several  (crypto-
graphic)  mechanisms.  In order to enhance the trustworthiness  of the an-
onymity system, several Mixes are chained together. The sender of a given 
message can only be deanonymised if all Mixes along the path of his mes-
sage reveal  the  linkage between the  appropriate  incoming and outgoing 
messages. Therefore, the use of multiple Mixes offers protection against dis-
honest Mix operators.
FIGURE 1: SIMPLIFIED “BLACK BOX” MODEL OF AN.ON: THE IP ADDRESSES 
OF THE SENDERS ARE EXCHANGED WITH THE IP ADDRESS OF THE 
ANONYMISATION SERVICE
In order to easy the explanations one can imagine our anonymisation 
service as a simple proxy which a user uses to hide its own IP-address, e.g.  
towards a web server (see Figure 1). In terms of sentence (6) of §113a of the 
Telecommunications Act the proxy, that is the anonymity service, replaces 
the IP-address of the user (IPU) with its own IP-address (IPOut).
An urging question is which data has to be logged by anonymity ser-
vices such as AN.ON in order to comply with the data retention law. In 
§113a, the Telecommunications Act distinguishes several types of service 
and defines for each service the sort of data to be stored. The best match for 
AN.ON is ‘Internet Service Provider’ (ISP). According to the Telecommunic-
ations Act, an ISP has to log the IP address of a user, a unique identifier of 
the connection, and the period of time in which this assignment was valid.  
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In combination with sentence (6), this means that the anonymity service has 
to log the replacement of IP addresses only, but nothing more, particularly 
no ‘identifiers’ of higher layers, such as TCP-port numbers etc. Besides, con-
sulted lawyers argue that only the replacement of source IP addresses (but 
not destination IP addresses) are allowed to be retained. They justify their 
assessment  with  sentence (8)  of  §113a:  ‘…data  about  retrieved  Internet 
pages must not be retained.’ The lawyers also concluded that logging is al-
lowed only for IP packet flows in upstream direction, that is only for pack-
ets from the user to the service, a web server for instance, but not for down-
stream packets.
Summarising, each retained log entry can be seen as a pair of IP-address 
and timestamp: (IPU, t). As IPOut of the proxy will be visible in suspicious re-
quests, the law enforcement agencies ask questions in the form of: “Who 
was using IP-address IPOut at time tR”. In order to answer such questions we 
need to search through our log files for all records with timestamps  ti for 
which: tR - ε ≤ ti ≤ tR + ε. The need for the parameter ε reflects the fact that we 
cannot  assume that all  clocks of all  servers creating log records are syn-
chronised.
1.3. INCREASED RISKS FROM LEGAL COMPLIANCE
Standard secure logging mechanisms such as [MaTs09] protect the logged 
records sufficiently against unauthorized access (confidentiality), unauthor-
ized modification (integrity) and in some cases attempt to ensure availabil-
ity of records. But when applied to the needs of data retention logging on 
the logging entity side, newly arising risks remain unsolved as the attacker 
model has changed.
Potentially sensitive data are now present on logging entity side as a res-
ult of compliance with data retention legislation. The logging entity (Mix 
operator) can be forced to reveal, delete or modify this data—threats that 
did not exist before as there was no need to store such data in the first place. 
Specifically, threats related to the data retention period must be addressed 
and mitigated. Note that the risk for a user to be deanonymised, if the oper-
ators of the chosen anonymity servers behave dishonestly, exists before the 
introduction of data retention. But if the operators are  honest, the attacker 
gains an additional advantage of mounting a successful attack on the an-
onymity of a given user with the help of retained data. Moreover, it is now 
possible for the attacker to start his attack after the fact (i.e. after the activity, 
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the attacker wants to deanonymise took place). This was not possible be-
fore, as the attacker had to log the anonymised and encrypted traffic at the 
time of this activity in order to analyse it later on.
Additional new risks arise from the fact that the logged data is not only 
stored, but also used for law enforcement. Assume the attacker modifying 
the logged data so that an innocuous user of the anonymity service becomes 
suspicious when modified retained data are used in criminal investigation.  
For an operator of an anonymisation server, the new risk is that an attacker 
may force him to modify the logged data in such a way or in other way 
which hides the criminal activities of the attacker. Thus a suitable logging 
scheme should not only protect the users of the anonymity service but also 
its operators.
2. THE PROPOSED SCHEME FOR SECURE LOGGING
This paper abstracts from the unnecessary technical details of the scheme 
we  proposed  in  [KS09]  and  focuses  on  the  impact  and  usability  of  the 
scheme from the perspective of law enforcement. Here, we will summarize 
only the most important conceptual properties to demonstrate, that data re-
tention logging can be efficiently implemented in a secure way which also 
mitigates the risks of anonymity service operators.
The logged data has to be stored encrypted and integrity protected (cf.  
requirement R4). The encryption ensures that the content of the logged data 
can not be revealed without the knowledge of the secret key. The advantage 
of encrypting the logged data is that the data can be protected using avail -
able  (probably  insecure)  backup  mechanisms.  Note  that  because  of  this 
backup, it is in generally not possible to (provably) delete the retained data. 
So the “deletion” has to be accomplished by cryptographic means (e.g., by 
destruction of a decryption key8).
Confidentiality and integrity of the retained records can be achieved by 
either symmetric or asymmetric encryption. Asymmetric encryption has the 
advantage that no secret key needs to be stored on the logging server but 
suffers from poor performance compared to the symmetric encryption. We 
utilize a hybrid encryption scheme where the symmetric encryption is used 
8 Deletion  of  a  single  decryption  key,  which  is  not  part  of  any  backup,  is  much  easier  
compared to ensuring that every backup copy of a given log file is deleted. This is especially 
true if the backup in place is not under full control of the operator of the anonymisation  
server itself.
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for  the  log  entries  itself.  The corresponding  symmetric  key kY is  stored 
within the log file using asymmetric encryption.
The private key is stored on a trusted device (e.g., smart card) with abil -
ity to control the access to the private key thus also to retained data. As res-
ult, an access to outdated log files (cf. requirement R2) is prevented and the 
risk that the operator is forced by the attacker to decrypt outdated log files 
is mitigated. Therefore, an important property of the access control to the 
private key implemented by the trusted device is, that it not only depends 
on proper authorisation (e.g. password of the operator) but also on the cur-
rent time. The idea is, that the trusted device denies decryption of a symmet-
ric key (used to unlock access to log records) if the related log file is already 
outdated (outside the data retention period).  If the smart card is used as 
trusted device, reliable time can be obtained from trusted time servers via 
the TSP protocol [RFC3136].
For the protection of log file integrity, we need to prevent/detect modi-
fication of a log entry, copying of a log entry to another position within a 
log file or to a different log file, truncation of the log file and completely re-
placing a whole log file by a forged one. Integrity of a single log entry can 
be verified through Message Authentication Code (MAC) as usual defence. 
In order to prevent the deletion of a legitimate log file  and creation of a 
completely forged one we utilise a combination a multiple mechanisms: di-
gital signatures, distribution of integrity checksums and trusted timestamp-
ing.
The  “digital  signature”  mechanism  basically  means  that  the  logging 
server digitally signs the log files. The “distribution” mechanism means that 
every artefact (e.g. signature test keys) involved in the integrity verification 
process are distributed in a way so that it is hard for the attacker to manipu-
late all copies simultaneously. One way to achieve this is to utilise censor-
ship resistant P2P-networks such as FreeNet [CSWH00] or Free Heaven [Di-
FM00]. The “trusted timestamping” mechanism means that every artefact 
mentioned above is time stamped by multiple external trusted timestamp-
ing services.
The practical implementation of the scheme was demonstrated with Java 
Card smart card as trusted device. Logging performance was demonstrated 
to be very good, as well as the searching performance for locating entries 
relevant to data retention request.
2011] S. Köpsell, P. Švenda: Law Enforcement and Data Retention... 313
A demand for the practical implementation originates from the needs of 
the AN.ON anonymity service.  But the proposed logging scheme can be 
used for  other services  affected by the data retention legislation as well.  
More generally, the scheme can be used for any logging service where the 
logged records should be accessible only for a limited time period or where 
knowledge of cryptographic secrets might lead to personal threats of the 
holder.
3. EXPERIENCE WITH ABUSE OF THE ANONYMISATION 
SERVICE AND WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT
AN.ON is available for the public since September 2000. Currently, we are 
offering our service both free of charge through volunteering Mix operators 
as well as commercial service through a spin-off company9. Since 2000 we 
observed a constantly growing number of users. At the moment we have 
roughly 6000 users online at the same time. We estimate that we have more 
than 50000 users who use our service on a regular base (see [BeBK08] for a 
description of an empirical study which leads to that number, although by 
the nature of our service we do not collect any identifying information us-
able  for  giving  a  precise  number  of  users).  Currently  our  service  an-
onymises more than 800 million web requests per month leading to more 
than 20 TByte of transmitted data.
9 <http://www.jondos.org/>
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Year total law requests private requests
2001 13 7 6
2002 40 15 25
2003 58 21 37
2004 61 38 23
2005 42 27 15
Sum 221 112 109
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF RECEIVED REQUESTS FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES AND PRIVATE PERSONS AND COMPANIES [ULD06]
IN PERIOD 2001 – 2005. SINCE 2006, AROUND 2–4 REQUESTS FROM LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PER MONTH AND 3–6 PRIVATE REQUESTS ARE 
RECEIVED. THE DRAWING RELATES THE MISUSE TO THE USE OF THE 
ANONYMISATION SERVICE.
Unfortunately, also some misuse results from the operation of the an-
onymisation service. We learn about such misuse if we receive “request for 
information” from affected party. Such requests can be basically divide into 
two types:  a)  requests  from private persons,  organisations  or  companies 
(consecutively named “private requests”) and b) requests from law enforce-
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ment agencies (“law requests” for short). Table 1 gives an overview about 
the number of requests we received per year (from 2001 to 2005). Since 2006 
we get around 2–4 requests from law enforcement agencies per month and 
3–6 private requests. Note that we can only report about incidents which we 
get to know by some “requests for information”. Clearly there is a number 
of unknown cases: law enforcement agencies told us, that they will not ask 
us any longer because they already know that they will not get any useful 
information if the anonymisation service was involved. Nevertheless we do 
not believe that the true amount of misuse would be extraordinary higher 
compared to the reported misuse. Otherwise we would expect much more 
“attention” of law enforcement agencies with respect to our anonymisation 
service.
Some of the private requests just want that we stop any of the reported 
abusive activities. We solve that by blocking the access to the reported web 
site from our anonymisation service. But all the requests from law enforce-
ment agencies and most of the private requests ask for the person who uses 
a given IP-address – which is one of the IP-addresses of our anonymisation 
servers – at a given point in time. During the times when data retention was 
not an obligation we just responded that we do not have logged any data so 
that we can not provide any useful information. Such negative responses 
were  accepted  by  nearly  all  law  enforcement  agencies  and  most  of  the 
private persons and companies without any further comments. Only a very 
few of the law enforcement agencies started some kind of “ethical discus-
sion” but at the end accepted our explanations with respect to data protec-
tion and the related data protection laws, as operating an anonymisation 
service is completely legal in Germany.
Although we saw all kind of reasons for law requests during the last 10 
years, the majority of the law requests were related to some kind of finan-
cial frauds especially credit card frauds or more generally spoken the iden-
tity frauds. Child pornography was the reason for the law requests only in 
three cases.
The  reasons  for  private  requests  were  mainly  because  of  blaming  of 
people (e.g. in chats, e-mails, blogs etc.) or “vandalism” i.e. activities which 
affect the functionality of a given web service e.g. by changing the content 
of a web site or manipulating the data stored in the underlying database 
system.
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Note that most of the law requests deal with “ex tunc” incidents. Only 
few of them (less then 5) requested “ex nunc” observations (comparable to 
lawful interceptions known from the plain old telephone). The reason for 
that small number can be seen in the special situation in Germany which 
not only requires a court order but also the suspicion for a (serious) crime 
listened in a special catalogue. I.e. law enforcement agencies would not get 
such court order just for investigating a credit card fraud. Nevertheless to 
the best of our knowledge none of the observations leads to actually catch-
ing a criminal.
Summarising the said, one can conclude that our anonymisation service 
was and will  be misused to some extend – but the amount of misuse is 
much smaller than usually expected by uninformed person.
4. DISCUSSION OF PRACTICAL USABILITY OF RETAINED 
DATA
Our anonymisation service basically exchanges the IP-addresses of its users 
with its own outgoing IP-address IPOut (see Figure 1). Therefore answer to a 
typical law enforcement question: “Who uses IP-address  IPOut at time  t? ” 
with the help of the retained data will  only reveal the IP-addresses of  all 
users which were logged-in resp. active at time t, not a single one usually 
expected by law enforcement requester. In [BeBK08] we reported the results 
of an empirical study showing that such a request led to at least 400 differ-
ent IP-addresses on our anonymisation servers used the most. Clearly, such 
amount of suspicious persons is not helpful for most if not all law enforce-
ment investigations.
Additional  we  studied  the  case  where  the  law  enforcement  agency 
(through some external knowledge) knows, that the same offender used the 
anonymisation service at multiple points in time (t1...tx). Therefore the law 
enforcement agency could request the sets of suspicious IP-addresses for all 
these points in time and afterwards calculate the intersection of these sets of 
suspicious IP-addresses, as the offenders IP-address has to be an element of 
that intersection.10 Our study revealed that if two different points in time are 
chosen (same offender uses anonymity service twice), chances are very high 
that the intersection will contain more than 10 IP addresses. Even if the in-
tersection is calculated for 10 different points in time the chance that the in-
10 Note that assuming that the offender always has the same IP-address represents already the 
best case for the law enforcement agency.
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tersection would reveal more than one suspicious IP-address is not negli-
gible. This is especially true if the offender behaves intelligently and follows 
some rules which were explained in detail in [BeBK08].
From January 2009 until  March 2010, i.e.  the time data retention was 
lawful in Germany, we received around 10 written law requests which were 
related to retained data. Some of them had formal errors, e.g. referred to the 
wrong paragraphs etc. None of the received requests fulfils the requirement 
of showing a court order which in turn refers to one of the needed offences  
listened in the catalogue of offences. So there  was no need to reveal any of 
the retained data,we answered accordingly and answer was accepted in all 
cases.
Despite the written requests we also had some telephone calls from law 
enforcement agencies (again around 10) asking for the retained data. We ex-
plained that we need a court order which fulfils the requirements set by the 
constitutional court. But again none of the communicated cases was of the 
kind needed, i.e. was not able to get the necessary court order.
As a side remark we like to report on one of these telephone calls. Here a 
police man from the German Federal Criminal Office (BKA) asked about the 
general availability of retained data. We explained the necessity of the right 
court order, which in this case was not seen as a problem as explained by 
the police man. When we explained that we expect at least 400 IP-address as 
a result (based on our empirical study), the police man acknowledge that 
this amount of suspicious IP-addresses is not helpful for his investigations. 
We therefore explained the basic idea of the calculation of the intersection 
(as  explained  above).  This  approach  was  well  understood by  the  police 
man. But even the envisaged much smaller set of suspicious IP-addresses 
(we told him, that he might get “a handful of IP-addresses”) was not nar-
rowed down enough. We were told that the police man in such case would 
afterwards not get the needed search warrants, i.e. a judge would not sign 
say five search warrants knowing that four of them targeting innocent cit-
izens. Although we only had such experience once it might indicate that 
even a little uncertainty with respect to the correctness of the conclusions  
drawn from the retained data might render them useless for practical in-
vestigations.
Finally we want to report on case which is not directly related to a re-
quest for retained data but illuminates the usefulness of the retained data 
from a different perspective. In this case a German police man sent the usu-
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al law request. The request was dated October 2010 requesting information 
with respect to some incident which happened May 2008. We checked back 
if really 2.5 years old information were requested. The simple answer was: 
“Yes. The request is based on an international letter of request originated 
from Portugal”. Given that time frame and assuming that a request from 
some member state of the European Union should take less time compared 
to a request from some country outside of Europe it shows that for effective 
law enforcement the retained data needs to be stored at least say 5 years 
(with associated privacy risks on the other side) – if not forever (of course 
one could also try to optimise the organisational procedures but this is out 
of scope of this paper.)
5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
The compliance with the new data retention directive introduces not only 
benefits for the law enforcement agencies, but also additional risks for the 
users and operators of the communication service that need to be mitigated. 
We have proposed, implemented and start into the practical usage a secure 
logging service based on a combination of log file encryption, key recovery 
with  smart  cards  and  data  retention  period  enforcement  via  trusted 
timestamping servers. The implementation is available for public use. An 
operator cannot be forced to reveal logged records outside the data reten-
tion period, because the period is enforced directly on the smart card with 
the help of trusted timestamping servers.
The log data of selected German AN.ON servers were protected with the 
proposed mechanism since 1st January 2009 until the 2nd of March 2010, 
when the German constitutional court decided to stop data retention.
A new data retention law will  be  introduced in  Germany soon (with 
high probability). This new law will mandate secure storage and transmis-
sion of retained data according to the decision of the constitutional court. 
Although our implementation for storing retained data already fulfils these 
requirements, it can be foreseen that some official certification might be re-
quired. This would comprise the usage of certified hardware and software 
components.
One reason we assume this lays in the current version of the German 
Technical Guideline for the implementation of legal measures for surveil-
lance of telecommunications and information requests for traffic data (TR 
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TKÜV)11. These regulations cover (in Part B) also the requirements for re-
tained data transmission. Although at the moment legacy means (like tele-
fax or data carrier) are still admissibly a transmission of the retained data 
according the ETSI specification TS 102 657 is envisaged. This kind of trans-
mission would require the participation in a governmental virtual private 
network (VPN) which in turn requires certification of the participating entit-
ies and the usage of certified hardware. The biggest problem with these re-
quirements is the high expenses making the volunteering operation of an 
anonymisation server infeasible.
Moreover additional legal obligations and responsibilities might appear 
soon. One of these obligations is already somehow into force – the obliga-
tion of a communication service provider to block the access to certain web 
sites on request of law enforcement agencies because of child pornography. 
We say “somehow into force” because on the one hand the law passed all  
the necessary steps and is therefore – from a theoretical point of view – in  
force. But on the other hand there exist official instructions which forbid the 
law enforcement agencies to actually request any blocking. (Some lawyers 
argue that this way of de facto repealing a law is unconstitutional, but such 
a discussion is out of scope of this paper.) Again chances are high that the 
consequences of this law will come into force soon and again this means ex-
penses for the certified communication infrastructure necessary to get ac-
cess to the list of web sites to be blocked.
Finally the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) might be rati-
fied soon. Depending on the final regulations it might introduce liability of 
communication providers in case of copyright infringements. The misuse of 
AN.ON together with such kind of liability will led to an incalculable finan-
cial risk for Mix operators.
To summarise: when we started in 2000 with the deployment of our an-
onymisation service the main obstacle was the resource consumption of the 
servers in terms of computing power and bandwidth. Today one can rent 
the required resources for less than 100 EUR per month making the opera-
tion of an anonymisation server feasible for a small data protection associ-
ation or even private person. But it  turned out that the legal obligations 
today and especially the uncertainty with respect to liability are the main 
reasons for thwarting a broader deployment of our anonymisation service.
11 <http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/153316/publicationFile/6608/20
10-04-27_TRTKUE6-0Englishpdf.pdf>
320 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 5:2
REFERENCES
[1]  [BeBK08] Stefan Berthold, Rainer Böhme, Stefan Köpsell: Data Retention and  
Anonymity Services; Proc. The Future of Identity in the Information Society - Chal-
lenges for Privacy and Security, FIDIS/IFIP Internet Security & Privacy Fourth Inter-
national Summer School, Springer, Boston, IFIP Advances in Information and Com-
munication Technology, volume 298, 2009, 92–106.
[2]  [BeFK00] Oliver Berthold, Hannes Federrath, Stefan Köpsell: Web MIXes: A  
System for Anonymous and Unobservable Internet Access; Proc. of Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies Workshop (PET 2000), Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg, LNCS 2009, July 
2000, 115–129.
[3]  [Chau81] David Chaum: Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, 
and Digital Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24/2, 1981, 84–88.
[4]  [CSWH00] Ian Clarke, Oskar Sandberg, Brandon Wiley, Theodore W. Hong: 
Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System; Proc. of the 
Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, Berkeley, CA, 
Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg, LNCS 2009, July 2000.
[5]  [DiFM00] Roger Dingledine, Michael J. Freedman, David Molnar: The Free  
Haven Project: Distributed Anonymous Storage Service; Proc. of the Workshop on 
Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, Berkeley, CA, Springer, Berlin / 
Heidelberg, LNCS 2009, July 2000.
[6]  [DiMS04] Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, Paul F. Syverson: Tor: The  
Second-Generation Onion Router; Proc. of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium, Au-
gust 2004, 303–320.
[7]  [KS09] Stefan Kopsell, Petr Švenda: Secure logging of retained data for an an-
onymity service; IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, Vol. 
320, pp. 284-298, 2009.
[8]  [MaTs09] Di Ma, Gene Tsudik: A new approach to secure logging; ACM Trans-
actions on Storage (TOS), vol. 5, issue 1, ACM, New York, March 2009.
[9]  [RFC 3161] C. Adams, P. Cain, D. Pinkas, R. Zuccherato: Internet X.509 Public  
Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP); August 2001, Proposed Standard, Avail-
able online: <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3161.txt>
[10]  [TKG07] Bundestag: Gesetz zur Neuregelung der Telekommunikationsüber-
wachung und anderer verdeckter Ermittlungsmaßnahmen sowie zur Umsetzung der Richt-
linie 2006/24/EG vom 21. Dezember 2007; Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 2007, Teil I, 
Nr. 70, December 2007, 3198–3211, ausgegeben zu Bonn.
[11]  [TKG04] Bundestag: Telekommunikationsgesetz vom 22. Juni 2004 (2007),  
BGBl. I S. 1190, zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 21. Dezember 2007  
(BGBl. I S. 3198).
[12]  [ULD06] Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Hol-
stein: Abschlussbericht für das Projekt AN.ON – Juristische Arbeitspakete –; Ab-
schlussbericht des AN.ON Projektes, Förderkennzeichen 01 MS 917, 9. Oktober 2006.
